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Abstract
Graphical user interfaces for high-assurance systems must
fulfill a range of security requirements such as pro-
tected and reliable presentation, prevention of unautho-
rized cross-domain talk, and prevention of user-input
eavesdropping. Additionally, it is desirable to support
legacy applications running in confined compartments.
Standard isolation methods such as virtual-machine mon-
itors provide one frame buffer per security domain, where
each frame buffer is managed by one legacy window sys-
tem. This raises the question of how to safely integrate
multiple (legacy) window systems and protect the dis-
played data while preserving the usability of modern user
interfaces.
Our paper describes the Overlay Window System, a gen-
eral mechanism for multiplexing windows of multiple dis-
tinct window systems into the host frame buffer. Thus,
each legacy window appears to the user as one correspond-
ing host window that can be moved and resized. To achieve
this, only slight modifications of the legacy window sys-
tem are required whereby, the source code does not have to
be available. Our implementation of an Overlay Window
System successfully multiplexes Linux, GEM and native
L4 applications.
1 Introduction
The ever-increasing number of security-sensitive platforms
connected to untrusted public networks raises a high de-
mand of executing trusted and untrusted applications side-
by-side on one device. For example, people store and
process private data on PDAs using trusted software and
execute gadgets—downloaded from untrusted sources—
which are potentially malicious (malware). There exist
plenty of options to deal with such scenarios, which fall
into two categories:
Firstly, there are operating systems that provide strong
application-level isolation and protection. Prominent
examples are the L4 family [18] and EROS [19]—a
capability-based operating system. They provide a cus-
tom infrastructure to build applications, which in turn are
especially designed for these operating systems. For exam-
ple, with DOpE [11, 12] and EWS [20] there exist custom
trusted window systems for these operating systems. The
common drawback of these solutions is the lack of avail-
able applications.
Secondly, with virtual machine monitors and sandbox-
ing techniques, there exist powerful solutions to partition
one physical computer system into multiple protection do-
mains where each domain can be an entirely different oper-
ating system. Ḧartig [15] presents an overview of such ar-
chitectures and emphasizes the trend of wide application of
these techniques in system design. Virtual machines lead
to an unmatched flexibility and availability of user applica-
tions. As described in [14], the latests efforts with secure
booting techniques—namely TCPA [6]—pushed the appli-
cation area of these approaches even further. Even though
the known approaches are technically different, they have
one drawback in common that shrinks the application area
significantly. There exists virtually no model for secure
user interaction with multiple security domains.
In this paper, we present a generic solution for the
addressed problem and discuss application scenarios of
deploying virtualization and sandboxing techniques com-
bined with our user-interaction model.
Currently available virtual machines perform user inter-
action based on consoles. Traditionally, there exist two in-
terfaces for the interaction with the user: input devices and
a frame buffer display. This paradigm appears antiquated
regarding the modern way of user interaction with com-
puter systems. Today, we expect to interact with windowed
applications that can freely be arranged on the screen.
Existing virtual machines do not to deal with such ap-
plications but leave the window management to the virtu-
alized legacy operating system. This way, the virtual frame
buffer, containing all windows of the legacy operating sys-
tem, is presented to the user as one host window or as full
screen (Figure 1).
Once multiple instances of virtual machines come into
play, as described in the numerous application scenarios
in [13], the problem of multiplexing virtual frame buffers
immediately arises and the full-screen approach becomes
unfeasible.
We want to integrate multiple legacy window systems
into one user environment. Thus, we approach the follow-
ing problems:
• The way of how windows are managed and how re-
draw operations are performed differs among legacy
operating systems.
• We want to integrate proprietary legacy operating sys-
tems of which the source code is not available.
• We cannot access the internal data structures that rep-
resent the user interface on the legacy operating sys-
tem.
• All properties of used virtualization and sandboxing
techniques in regard to isolation and protection of se-
curity domains must persist.
In this paper, we present a solution for the problems men-
tioned above. We can integrate any number of legacy win-
dow systems running on different virtual machines. The
legacy window systems can even use virtual frame buffers
of different sizes and color depths. This can be achieved
with virtually no (or marginal) modifications of the legacy
operating systems. As a proof-of-concept, we integrated
three entirely different window systems—namely X11,
GEM and DOpE—into one user environment while run-
ning them inside fully isolated security domains. For this,
we required no access to the GEM source code.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Sec-
tion 2 we describe our basic mechanism to multiplex win-
dow systems. It is followed by Section 3 that describes
the actual implementation of our mechanism. Section 4
highlights new application fields, which can be captured
by virtual machines combined with our technique. In Sec-
tion 5 we give an overview about related work and put our
work in the context of trusted window systems. Section 6
concludes the paper with an outlook to future work.
2 Mechanism
2.1 Nested-window-systems approach
Current implementations of virtual machines virtualize (or
emulate) standard hardware devices to enable guest oper-
ating systems to perform I/O operations. This way, legacy
operating systems reuse existing device drivers to access
virtual input devices or graphics cards, and thus, the host
system.
The common technique for emulating graphics cards is
to provide a virtual frame buffer to the guest. The legacy
window system renders its private window stack into the
virtual frame buffer (Figure 1). Thereby, the window sys-
tem translates its logical representation (e. g., window lists
and window-decoration configuration) into the physical
representation of pixels in the frame buffer. The physical
representation of the legacy system contains no semantics
about the displayed information anymore, so that the logi-
cal representation is not known to the host window system.
Therefore, established virtual machines render the virtual
frame buffer into one big host window.
This approach has several usability drawbacks. Firstly,
the virtual-machine window is unhandy due to its size and
pollutes the screen. Secondly, all legacy windows are on
the same stacking level regarding host window order. This
highly restricts the flexibility of application-window place-
ment. Interaction with such nested window systems is nei-
ther natural nor efficient.
2.2 Overlay window system—hosting
legacy windows
The above-mentioned limitations are not caused by the
utilization of the virtual frame buffer but by the loss of
Physical frame buffer
Logical representation
Virtual frame buffer Legacy window system
Window layer 1
Window layer 2
Physical representation
Host window system
Windowed frame
Figure 1: Virtual frame buffer displayed as one host win-
dow. Legacy window information are only exported as
virtual frame buffer and the virtual machine displays the
entire frame as one host window. Windows are displayed
with shadows at the logical representation level to high-
light the fact, that the semantics are known not only the
pixel data.
important information on the way from the legacy win-
dow system to the host representation. Since the exist-
ing interfaces—frame buffer and input devices—alone are
insufficient, we looked for novel ways to obtain the se-
mantics of legacy windows. An ideal (i. e. cooperative)
legacy window system for our purposes would provide
additional window information besides the virtual frame
buffer. Thus, a host window system is able to manage
legacy and host windows similarly, as it would know about
the semantics of legacy windows. This approach is com-
parable to remote GUI protocols (e. g., X11 or RDP), but
needs fewer high-level commands.
We have to tackle the problem of how to export legacy
window contents, positions, and sizes. Furthermore, the
host window system needs to know the legacy window
stacking order to present a consistent global window state
to the user. Figure 2 illustrates this idea.
The generic export of window state information from ar-
bitrary legacy window systems is tricky, as the used data
structures differ significantly. Keeping the two window
stacks—legacy and host—consistent on the basis of totally
different structures appears to be infeasible. On the other
hand, window-statechanges(e. g., movement or resizing)
are very easy to export. The host window system can use
them to reconstruct the legacy window configuration on
the host side.
We call such a window systemOverlay Window System
as it overlays distinct window stacks and thus, legacy and
host windows. The Overlay Window System trackstop
(come to front),move, resize, open, and closewindow-
state-change events, it receives from the legacy system.
This way, the Overlay Window System is at all times
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Figure 2: Overlay window system hosting legacy win-
dows. The legacy window system provides window infor-
mation to the Overlay Window System. The host presents
legacy windows as separate host windows (marked by
shadows in the overlay representation) to the user.
in a consistent state with the legacy window system and
may cover all possible legacy window configurations. We
implemented a simple state machine/tracker to map each
legacy window to a corresponding overlay window.
In contrast to remote protocols with high-level func-
tions, the Overlay Window System utilizes the physical
representation—virtual frame buffer—to access the actual
window contents and is thus more general than these proto-
cols. The frame-buffer representation is sufficient and it is
not required to know the complete contents of each single
window.
Virtual machines provide two low-level interfaces—
input devices and frame buffer—that enable the legacy sys-
tem to communicate with the host. The Overlay Window
System adds the high-level abstraction of aview. A view
is a rectangular region of the frame buffer plus a stream of
window events corresponding to one legacy window. For
this purpose,hooksinside the legacy windowing software
have to be identified and exploited viahooked functions.
Hooks are instructions that provide interfaces for future
expansion. The hooked function exports a state change to
the Overlay Window System via the view, when the con-
figuration of a legacy window changes. The view may be
a virtual device or may utilize another mechanism of the
virtualization platform (e. g., microkernel IPC).
The Overlay Window System receives all input events
from the user. It propagates only input events referring to
the inside of windows to the legacy system. In this case,
the input events are injected into the virtual input device of
the virtual machine.
User inputs referring the window controls cause state
changes of the windows (e. g., resize) and are a higher-
level problem. The Overlay Window System informs the
hooked function installed at the legacy window system
about these state changes via the view abstraction. In turn,
the hooked function initiates reconfiguration of the appro-
priate window. Thus, the state of the view remains consis-
tent.
We assume the legacy window system keeps its window
stack at all time locally consistent—local windows may
overlap invisible regions—and the virtual frame buffer
contains the appropriate physical representation. Other
host windows displayed may overlap existing legacy win-
dows, but cannot reveal locally-overlapped (i. e., invisible)
legacy regions. Thereby, the Overlay Window System can
display a consistent window configuration at all time uti-
lizing the virtual frame buffer and the view abstraction.
2.3 Hosting multiple legacy systems
Since the consistency property holds for multiple legacy
systems too, the approach described above is sufficient to
multiplex several legacy window stacks in an elegant way
(Figure 3). We exploit this fact to host two or more legacy
systems (e. g., operating systems for multiple security lev-
els) sharing one overlay screen. The distinct legacy win-
dow systems can even use different screen resolutions and
color depths. In this case, the Overlay Window System
scales the physical representation.
Legacy systems never interfere regarding the overlay
screen, because the Overlay Window System strongly sep-
arates different clients/systems. The implementation of the
display policy inside the Overlay Window System permits
configurations tailored to user or security demands, for ex-
ample, that no window of legacy systemA overlaps the top
window of B. Discussion of security policies is out of the
scope of this paper.
3 Implementation
We implemented our concept to proof its application in
real scenarios. The Overlay-Window-System mechanism
in not tied to any particular operating system and thus, it
could easily be implemented on top of the Linux operating
system with its large infrastructure. However, our argu-
mentation refers to trusted systems. Therefore, the mini-
mal complexity of the trusted computing base is our major
design criteria. We consider the monolithic Linux kernel
including its device drivers as far too complex to be part of
our trusted computing base.
A revision of our actual requirements led us to fairly
basic architectural demands:
• The host kernel must enforce isolation between multi-
ple protection domains but needs to enable monitored
communication between these domains.
• On top of the host kernel, there must exist a trusted
window system with native drivers for at least input
devices and the physical frame buffer.
• A sandbox for the safe execution of a legacy operat-
ing system is needed. This could be achieved with a
virtual machine monitor, an emulator, or a ported OS
personality.
Virtual frame buffer
Window layer 1
Virtual frame buffer
Window layer 1
Window layer 2
Physical frame buffer Overlay window system
Overlay representation
A B
Figure 3: Overlay Window System hosting legacy windows of multiple legacy operating systems. The overlaid representa-
tion is at all times consistent with all legacy systems.
3.1 Architectural playground
With the L4/Fiasco [18, 17] microkernel, there exists a
kernel that provides exactly the needed functionality of
enforcing protection domains and performing safe inter-
protection-domain communication. Furthermore, it pro-
vides some additional features such as real-time capability
and shared memory, which will pay off in our concrete ap-
plication scenarios described in Section 4. L4/Fiasco is
implemented with only 15,000 lines of code and runs on
x86 PCs.
With L4Linux [16], we identified a grateful victim to act
as a sandbox. L4 inux is an user-level port of the Linux
kernel on top of L4. The L4 kernel revokes all privileges
to access host devices from L4Linux. Multiple instances
of L4Linux can be started inside fully isolated protection
domains running unmodified Linux programs, for example
the X window system.
Right on top of the L4/Fiasco microkernel, we run a
stripped-down version of DOpE as the trusted window sys-
tem. Containing only 7,000 lines of C code, it features
powerful mechanisms to scale, display and synchronize
pixel buffers with client applications. It enforces separa-
tion of client applications, which can only receive user in-
put events refering to a window of the actual application.
As an additional candy, it is able to provide the real-time
capabilities of L4/Fiasco at the user-interface level [11].
3.2 Integrating XFree86 with DOpE
As described in Section 2, the Overlay Window System
relies on a virtual frame buffer, input devices, and views
to integrate a legacy window system. Fortunately, the
XFree86 [9] X window system provides clearly docu-
mented hooks for these interfaces:
• XFree86 provides a custom driver infrastructure to
access graphics cards and plain frame buffers. Thus,
we were able to export the output of X via a custom
virtual display driver, whose implementation was a
straightforward task—thanks to the shadowfb module
of XFree86.
• Input events can be passed to the X server via the
input-driver interface of XFree86.
• In X, the arrangement of windows is handled by a
window manager. We used a slightly modified ver-
sion of AEWM [1] to propagate window events from
X to the Overlay Window System and vice versa.
The hooks for these interfaces belong to one and the same
instance of L4Linux but are implemented in different pro-
cesses (X server and Window Manager). Therefore, they
cannot directly speak to DOpE because DOpE would con-
sider them as distinct client applications and thus, would
isolate them from each other.
With the Overlay Mediator, we introduce a new compo-
nent that acts as one DOpE client application while pro-
viding three distinct interfaces—namely Screen, Input and
View—to one sandbox. For each sandbox window, it cre-
ates a DOpE window that displays its corresponding part
of the virtual frame buffer and keeps its position, size and
stacking order consistent with the associated window of
the sandboxed window system. The Overlay Mediator for-
wards all input events applied to one of its DOpE windows
to the sandbox via the Input interface. Figure 4 illustrates
the relationship between DOpE, the Overlay Mediator, and
XFree86.
This way, we successfully integrated XFree86 windows
into DOpE by only using existing interfaces of XFree86.
We did not need to change L4Linux, our legacy operating
system, at all.
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Figure 4: Relationship between DOpE, the Overlay Medi-
ator and XFree86
As soon as a legacy window system provides interfaces
for screen drivers, input drivers, and window management,
it can be integrated into an Overlay Window System with
moderate effort. This is the case for almost all modern
window systems, for example, the graphical user interface
of the Microsoft Windows operating system.
3.3 A harder nut to crack: Atari GEM
With a modicum of effort, even legacy window systems
that lack clean interfaces for input devices, display devices
and window management can be convinced to cooperate
with an Overlay Window System.
We picked out one of the earliest window-based graph-
ical user interfaces—namely GEM—to demonstrate the
universality of our approach. For running GEM inside
a sandbox, we ported the Atari ST emulator Hatari [3]
to the L4/Fiasco platform. Hatari emulates all hardware
components of an Atari ST including display, mouse, and
keyboard; Hatari itself uses libSDL [4] as its hardware-
abstraction layer. We provided a custom version of lib-
SDL that uses the Screen and Input interfaces of a dedi-
cated Overlay Mediator as its backend. For passing win-
dow events in and out of the Hatari sandbox, we enhanced
Hatari by adding a new virtual hardware that provides win-
dow views. Hatari now passes all window events coming
from the Overlay Mediator into the sandbox via a memory-
mapped device. Until this point we did not modify GEM
itself. The same way, the sandboxed operating system
can propagate its window events to Hatari that—in turn—
forwards them to the Overlay Mediator.
To make GEM actually use these new virtual hard-
ware facilities, we had to install a small hook of less than
200 lines of assembly code at the GEM system-call inter-
face. Thus, we succeeded to integrate basic GEM windows
Figure 5: GEM and X11 window systems integrated into
DOpE. The sessions running are Linux with Xeyes (left)
and Xterm (center), GEM (upper left and top), and native
L4 real-time applications (right and lower left).
into our Overlay Window System with only a very small
effort—even without having any source code of GEM.
3.4 Results
Our successful experiments with integrating the user inter-
faces of the sandboxed legacy operating systems L4Linux
(X11) and GEM into the trusted DOpE environment
demonstrate the universality of the Overlay Window Sys-
tem approach (Figure 5).
Thanks to the used L4/Fiasco kernel, we kept the code
complexity of the trusted computing base in our scenario
as low as only 30,000 lines of code. In Figure 4, the
components of the trusted computing base are highlighted.
Note that the Overlay Mediator does not belong to the
trusted computing base. It acts as a translation tool that
is exlusively used by one sandbox. Therefore, it belongs to
the protection domain of this actual sandbox.
The raw output performance of the sandboxed window
system is equal to the traditional desktop-in-a-window ap-
proach because we do not introduce new pixel-copy oper-
ations. With the help of L4/Fiasco, DOpE can share pixel
buffers with its client applications. Thus, a virtual machine
can render its graphical output into the same buffer that is
used by DOpE to draw the window on screen.
4 Application scenarios
4.1 Multiple instances of L 4Linux
In Section 3, we presented how we integrated XFree86
with an Overlay Window System. This technique can
now be deployed to realize the initial scenario of running
trusted and untrusted applications on one device as consti-
tuted in Section 1.
4.1.1 Multi-level security
This scenario is a special case of a multi-level security ar-
chitecture. For each security level, we start one instance of
L4Linux with a corrsponding Overlay Mediator. For exam-
ple, when using two instances of L4Linux, one instance can
be used to perform security-sensitive tasks such as edit-
ing and storing confidential data, while another instance is
dedicated to download files from the Internet and execute
untrusted code. Both instances run inside isolated protec-
tion domains unable to communicate with each other on
their own. From the user’s point of view, both instances
are integrated into one desktop environment. Thus, he can
interact with both domains in a natural way. The Overlay
Window System labels all windows with their correspond-
ing domain to provide the integrity of displayed informa-
tion to the user. Additionally, there is a menu bar on top of
the screen that cannot be covered by any window. It dis-
plays the identity of the currently focused window. Thus,
we can prevent trojan horses running at the untrusted do-
main to gather security-sensitive information from the at-
tentive user.
4.1.2 Monitored flow of information
In [20], there is an extensive discussion about the flow of
information between applications—authorized by the user
via explicit drag-and-drop and copy-and-paste operations.
Although all information flow from the trusted domain
to the untrusted domain must be blocked, we need to pro-
vide a mechanism for transfering data from the untrusted
domain to the trusted domain. For this, we want to use
the well established X clipboard mechanism. A dedicated
oneway-communication channel from the untrusted do-
main to the trusted domain must be established and moni-
tored by the L4/Fiasco kernel. This communication chan-
nel can now be used to implement a custom protocol into
two dedicated X client applications—each running inside
one domain—to tunnel clipboard information over the uni-
directional communication channel.
4.2 Linux and Windows applications on
one desktop
VMware [7] permits to run a sandboxed Microsoft Win-
dows operating system on top of Linux. Thus, the great
functionality of Windows can be combined with security
policies implemented in Linux. With the current imple-
mentation, VMware either uses a fullscreen mode or dis-
plays the Windows desktop inside one X11 window.
In Figure 6, we illustrated a proposed solution for in-
tegrating Windows and Linux/X11 applications into one
desktop environment. The foundation of this scenario is
a commodity Linux running an X11 session with normal
X11 desktop applications and an Overlay Mediator imple-
mented as a plain X11 application. Just beside the visi-
ble X session, a second X server (Remedy X11) is exe-
cuted in the background and hosts the fullscreen window
of VMware running the Windows operating system. Rem-
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Figure 6: Running Microsoft Windows applications and
Linux/X11 applications side by side. VMware uses a rem-
edy X11 with virtual frame buffer and custom input device
driver while the Overlay Mediator displays guest windows
as host (X11) windows. Microsoft Windows is extended
by a hooked function that uses the view via network sock-
ets.
edy X11 uses custom drivers for input and a virtual frame
buffer, which use the Overlay Mediator as backend.
For synchronizing the views between the Overlay Me-
diator and Windows, a hook in the Windows Operating
system is needed. One way to implement such a hook is
providing a custom Explorer replacement. The communi-
cation of the hook with the Overlay Mediator can be per-
formed via sockets through the host-only networking facil-
ity of VMware.
4.3 Enhancing X11
As identified in [20], the X window system relies on co-
operating client applications. It does not protect client ap-
plications against each other. Once a client application has
access to the X server, it can compromise the security of
the X session by sniffing keys, grabbing the mouse, taking
screenshots and blocking the whole screen via a fullscreen
window.
The L4Linux approach combined with an Overlay Win-
dow System as presented in Section 3 allows the execution
of high-availability and trusted applications aside a run-
ning X server as native L4 processes. Examples for such
trusted applications are password checkers, signing appli-
cations, login managers, and video players with support
for digital rights management. These applications can nei-
ther be affected nor observed by L4Linux and thus, can im-
plement indispensable services. Furthermore, L4/Fiasco
and the DOpE window system provide real-time support
for native L4 applications, which can implement real-time
services with graphical output at guaranteed frame rates.
From the user’s point of view, such trusted or real-time
applications are tightly integrated into one environment to-
gether with X client applications.
4.4 Digging out buried operating sys-
tems
Ancient operating systems were designed without any se-
curity considerations assuming a nice behaviour of all ap-
plications. This assumption does not hold true with todays
broad use of the Internet. Still, such operating systems
host a wide base of available applications. Instead of aban-
doning these operating systems including all applications,
their functionality can still be used via appropriate sand-
boxes. The Overlay Window System goes a step further
and enables a tight integration of ancient applications into
a productive user environment of today.
Figure 5 depicts an example of this application scenario.
Window-based GEM applications running inside an Atari
ST emulator are displayed in distinct DOpE windows as
described in Section 3. There is also an X session run-
ning on an L4Linux instance. Additionally, there are na-
tive windows of the DOpE window system displaying the
output of real-time applications. Although the applications
belong to completely isolated protection domains, the win-
dows of these applications are integrated into one user en-
vironment.
5 Related work
5.1 Integration of legacy software
In this section, we go into prominent examples for solu-
tions integrating existing software into foreign platforms.
The virtual-machine approach adopted by VMware [7] and
Mac-on-Linux [5] is the first solution that comes to mind.
These virtual machines do a good job in reusing any oper-
ating system and application completely unmodified. The
dark side of the virtual-machine approach is that existing
implementations obtain almost no user-friendly interfaces.
The user ends up with console-style graphical user inter-
faces abandoned years ago.
Beside virtual machines, MacOS X [2] perfectly inte-
grates modern and classic MacOS applications with appli-
cations based on UNIX and X11 because usability is the
major design criteria for MacOS. In MacOS X (Quartz),
each window is buffered individually and the buffers pos-
sibly consume a better part of the memory. The Overlay
Window System approach needs no extra space beside one
virtual frame buffer for each legacy OS. In general, the Ma-
cOS solution needs—depending on the affected host oper-
ating system—extensive modifications of the legacy sys-
tem respectively (as with MacOS X) strong consideration
in the design process. On the other hand, the Overlay Win-
dow System approach only needs small helpers or patches
of the legacy system.
Another, radically different approach is the basis for
Wine [8]. It implements Windows functionality based on
the host-system infrastructure and provides the Applica-
tion Binary Interface (ABI) of the Windows operating sys-
tem. This approach is inherently platform specific and
tight-knit with the host operating system to achieve reason-
able performance. A grave shortcoming of this approach
is that Wine has to provide the complete ABI; a goal not
achieved until now because new features are added to the
ABI continuously and used by new applications. This
problem does not exist in our approach combined with a
virtual machine. A further advantage of an Overlay Win-
dow System compared to Wine is its simplicity and modest
demands to the host platform.
5.2 Trusted window systems
Trusted X [10] was an approach to make the X Window
System usable for multi-level security systems by running
dedicated untrusted X sessions (single-level server) for dif-
ferent compartments and factoring out the commonly used,
security-critical functionality into a separate trusted com-
ponent (TX master). TX master composes the output of
the single-level servers, distributes input events and im-
plements the policy for the sharing of information among
the single-level servers. It implements similar functional-
ity as an Overlay Window Server but is tied to one partic-
ular protocol (X protocol). Trusted X is an example of a
hardened legacy window system that is able to execute the
broad range of commodity X client software. The concrete
implementation of the security-sensitive parts of Trusted
X— as presented in [10]—consists of 30,000 lines of code.
As discussed in [20], such enhardened legacy window sys-
tems can still be regarded as complex when compared to
other approaches of trusted window systems and funda-
mental design flaws remain.
A much lower complexity can be achived by consider-
ing adequate security models during the design of a trusted
window system. For example, the EROS window system
consists of only 5,000 lines of code while it implements
security policies at the granularity of applications. The
drawback of such solutions is the absence of any available
commodity applications.
An Overlay Window System as presented in this paper
combines the advantages of both the broad range of exist-
ing applications on legacy systems and the ultimately low
complexity of specially-designed trusted window systems.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a mechanism and its implemen-
tation to integrate multiple legacy window systems of dis-
tinct security domains into one trusted user environment.
While deploying unmodified legacy window systems exe-
cuted at the trust levels of their corresponding domains, the
trusted computing base contains only a simple multiplexer
(Overlay Window System). With our implementation, we
kept the overall trusted computing base lower than 30,000
lines of code—including the L4/Fiasco kernel, basic re-
source managers and DOpE as Overlay Window System.
In our paper we focused on virtual frame buffers for
passing raw pixel data from legacy systems to the Overlay
Window System and thus left the hardware-acceleration
facilities of modern graphics cards unheeded. However,
these facilities are essential for a lot of today’s applica-
tions, for example, games and 3D software. Furthermore
in the current design, legacy systems cannot export fea-
tures like desktop enhancements, icons, or menubars out-
side of windows. In future work, we will address these
problems.
We described in Section 3.3 how we extended an emula-
tor by adding a dedicated virtual device for the propagation
of window events between the sandboxed operating sys-
tem and the host system—the view interface. In reverse: If
such a view interface pays off in an emulator/virtual ma-
chine, could this be also a reasonable extension for real
hardware? Modern graphics cards already implement a
very similar feature—called overlay. It is mostly used to
display video streams while bypassing the host’s window-
ing system and thus, avoiding overhead when displaying
streaming data. Consequently, a graphics card could be
the right place to implement (at least parts of) a minimal-
complexity Overlay Window System.
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